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Abstract
Although the concept of utility is fundamental to many economic theories, up to now a 
generally accepted method determining a subject’s utility function is not available. We 
investigated two methods that are used in economic sciences for describing utility functions 
by using response-locked event-related potentials in order to assess their neural 
underpinnings. For defining the certainty equivalent (CE), we used a lottery game with 
probabilities of 0.5, for identifying the subjects’ utility functions directly a standard bisection 
task was applied. Although the lottery tasks’ payoffs were only hypothetical, a pronounced 
negativity was observed resembling the error related negativity (ERN) previously described in 
action monitoring research, but this occurred only for choices far away from the indifference 
point between money and lottery. By contrast, the bisection task failed to evoke an ERN 
irrespective of the responses’ correctness. Based on these findings we are reasoning that only 
decisions made in the lottery task achieved a level of subjective relevance that activates 
cognitive-emotional monitoring. In terms of economic sciences, our findings support the view 
that the bisection method is unaffected by any kind of probability valuation or other 
parameters related to risk and in combination with the lottery task can, therefore, be used to 
differentiate between payoff and probability valuation. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of utility functions is fundamental to economics. Most theoretical considerations 
are based on arguments concerning the utility an agent gets from a good, inasmuch as it is not 
a good’s quantity or money per se that determines the actions of human beings, so called 
agents, but the utility they obtain from the good. Equilibrium concepts like the Nash 
equilibrium for strategic interactions of agents, the Walrasian equilibrium of economies, 
financial theory or the theory of political decision making are based on utility considerations. 
Expected utility theory and its modifications like Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979, 1992) are the most established theories for decision making under risk. Theoretically, 
utility theory is well-founded by an axiomatic approach with few intuitive axioms. However, 
and in contrast to the theoretical importance of utility considerations, up to now a generally 
accepted procedure how to measure utility does not exist. The need to have a method for 
determining utility functions is obvious, since in all areas, especially in risky decision making, 
violations of expected utility theory are known. Without a generally accepted approach for 
identifying utility, it will be impossible to figure out which theoretical predictions made by 
utility function related models do not fit observed decision making processes. If utility 
functions can not be measured, many predictions of economic models are neither testable nor 
implementable and, ultimately, models can not be falsified. Several key questions have 
therefore be answered: Is the concept of utility functions a normative construct, does it 
capture the key features of decision making processes or is it just a tool for describing 
behavioral data?  
In this paper we want to focus on the utility of money. Two main methods measuring utility 
are discussed in the literature: the evaluation of lotteries and the bisection method. In the first 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Prototypical decision task for the binary lottery (A) and the bisection task (B)  
 
approach, certainty equivalents (CE) of lotteries are determined for various amounts of money 
and various probabilities. In a standard approach the certainty equivalent method elicits a 
utility function by determining certainty equivalents of lotteries. Payoffs are offered by a 
lottery (p=0.5) and a sure win (“C” in figure 1A). The certainty equivalent CE is represented 
by the sure payoff for which a subject should be indifferent between the two alternatives. 
Within this framework a utility function is determined based on its assumed functional form, 
a probability weighting and an econometric analysis. Different approaches for econometric 
analyses are Regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982), Prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979, 1992) and Disappointment theory (Bell, 1985). A key problem of econometric 
analyses is the specification of a functional form for the evaluation of risky decisions and 
binary lotteries, respectively. Since each model hypothesizes a distinct functional form for the 
evaluation of money and probabilities, the determination of utility functions differs. 
Therefore, results depend on the specification of the functions and even the separation 
between probability evaluation and evaluation of money depends on this specification. One 
major short-coming of the binary lottery approach is that the evaluation of probabilities and 
money are not fully separable. Thus, risk aversion can be attributed to the shape of the utility 
function or to the probability weighting. The statement of prospect theory that individuals are 
risk averse for positive payoffs or high probabilities crucially depends on the econometric 
analysis. On the other hand, one of this method’s advantages is that agents really decide 
between options which lead to payoffs. 
 
In the second approach, the bisection method, agents are asked to specify differences in the 
utility associated with monetary payoffs. In this method, a utility function is elicited by 
determining mean points of utility within two utility values, so that a mean point M refers to 
an indifference position of a subject between both utility values. One possibility is, to present 
agents two amounts of money, x1 and x2, and ask them which amount of money M divides the 
utility difference u(x1)-u(x2) into halves, i.e. u(M)=(u(x1)+u(x2))/2. It is also feasible to show 
a third amount of money x3 (“C” in figure 1B) and to ask if this value divides the difference 
of x1 and x2 into halves ([u(x1)+u(x2)]/2=u(x3)). To achieve a monetary valuation without 
using lotteries, subjects are asked to evaluate their perceived ‘happiness that money brings’ 
(Galanter, 1962). In the present study the term ‘joy’ is used (associated with receiving a 
specified amount of money) in order to induce a monetary valuation context. By varying the 
parameters, a utility function can be obtained. The advantage of this method is that the utility 
function obtained does not depend on probabilities and the specification of a functional form, 
meaning that no theoretical presumptions are required. Its disadvantage is that decisions are 
neither connected to monetary nor to hypothetical payoffs. Both methods have been widely 
used and discussed in the literature. In most studies in experimental economics the evaluation 
of lotteries is used to determine utility functions or to test theories. The key argument for 
preferring the lottery method over the bisection method is that economic decisions should 
involve monetary payoffs, otherwise the decisions “are not for real”. This latter argument 
implies that decisions may involve different cognitive and emotional processes and – by 
extension – different neural processes.  
  
Compared to behavioral analyses the use of event-related potentials (ERP) during decision 
making tasks allows to reveal the neural underpinnings of cognitive processes related to 
response evaluation and thus to delineate the differences between decisions made in the 
lottery and bisection paradigms. In human beings cognitive control mechanisms are 
monitoring and evaluating ongoing actions permanently, enabling adaptation of behavior in a 
most flexible manner. Typical situations in which such mechanisms have been studied 
involve response selection from several action alternatives or the evaluation of currently made 
decisions. One ERP component related to response evaluation processes is the error-related 
negativity (ERN, Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993). This component was initially 
described to appear 50 to 100 ms following an incorrect response in choice-reaction tasks at 
fronto-central electrode sites and was postulated to reflect the perceived discrepancy between 
the intended and the actually performed motor action. Source analysis as well as simultaneous 
analysis of ERPs and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI, Debener et al., 2006; 
Dehaene et al., 1994; Mathalon et al., 2003) have shown that the ERN is generated in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), an area that is closely linked to several cognitive control 
mechanisms involved in decision making (Gehring and Knight, 2000; Paus, 2001). Recent 
investigations have shown that the ERN is sensitive to characteristics in error processing that 
are not directly linked to the violation of objective criteria as well. For example, an error’s 
relevance, as Hajcak et al. (2005) have shown by associating responses with different 
amounts of money, or differing emotional states in error processing (Luu et al., 2000; Tucker 
et al., 1999; Wiswede et al., 2009) are influencing the extent of an error’s impact as indexed 
by varying ERN amplitudes. As Hewig has shown, the selection of high risk decisions 
resulted also in an ERN, inasmuch the selection of such a response implies a high chance not 
to get the response’s intended outcome and will be processed as an erroneous deviation from 
internal choice strategies. Based on their initial approach explaining error processing in terms 
of reinforcement learning (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; see also Munte et al., 2007 for 
electrophysiological evidence) Holroyd and Coles (2008) described the occurrence of an ERN 
in the absence of external ascertainable response criteria. Accordingly, responses are matched 
against internal criteria that were formed by individual learning histories. Therefore, the 
occurrence of an ERN is not reflecting an error like in a typically speeded stimulus-response 
task, but the classification of a given response to be “sub-optimal” (Holroyd and Coles, 2008) 
with regard to internal representations. The ERN appearing in such kind of tasks may reflect 
the subjective value of a potential response.  
 
To summarize, ERN indexes decisions associated with errors and depends on the significance 
of response alternatives whereas choices that are unequivocally correct or fit the subject’s 
response strategies do not give rise to an ERN. In the present investigation we use the ERN as 
a tool to differentiate the neural responses associated with decisions made in the lottery and 
bisection paradigms. Our prediction is that lottery decisions will be associated with increased 
monitoring, since the payoff instruction increases the subjective relevance or value in this task 
and should be reflected by the ERN amplitude. ERPs in the bisection task should not feature 
an ERN, because here responses have neither to be matched against set criteria nor are they 
associated with subjective relevance. Ultimately, we want to use the results of this 
investigation to argue for an approach allowing one to determine a utility function for money 
and separate the effects of risk and the utility of money in the evaluation of money.  
 
2. Material and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Sixteen neurological healthy, right-handed subjects participated in our study (10 women, age 
range 21 to 29). Two subjects were excluded from data analysis because of technical 
problems. Additionally, one subject made no disadvantageous responses in the range from 
390 to 100 and was excluded from data analysis as well. Therefore we performed the analysis 
with 13 subjects. Subjects were paid for participation receiving seven Euros per hour. The 
study protocol was approved by the ethics committee of Magdeburg University. 
 
2.2. General Procedure 
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair in front of a 19“-CRT monitor. A modified 
computer mouse was positioned under each index finger as a response device. The experiment 
consisted of two sessions which took place within 3-7 days. In both sessions identical 
stimulus material was presented but with differing task instructions.  Every session began 
with 20 practice trials to familiarize subjects with the task. Thereafter the session started 
comprising 10 blocks of 82 trials each.   
 
2.3. Task 
In each trial, lasting between 2700 to 3400 ms, a string of 3 numbers surrounded by a white 
box was presented (see figure 1). The two outer numbers were shown first. After 1000 ms, the 
 
 
 
Figure 2: experimental paradigm  
 
inner number was added and the completed string stayed on the screen for another 1000 ms. 
The string’s left number was always zero. If numbers on the right were between 800 and 
1000, the mid position numbers varied between 100 and 700, in case the right-sided numbers 
were between 1020 and 1200, mid position numbers were in the range of 300 to 900. 
Numbers in the middle were varied in steps of 50, right-sided numbers in steps of 20. Before 
presentation numbers within each string were multiplied by 1, 10 or 100, resulting in three 
strings being ‘0 350 1120’, ‘0 3500 11200’ and ‘0 35000 112000’. 
In the bisection task, the outer numbers corresponded to the utility interval’s boundaries and 
the inner number to this interval’s center. By pressing the left or right index finger (YES/NO) 
subjects indicated whether the number presented was their perceived mean point/ center 
(YES) or not (NO). 
In the binary lottery task subjects had to choose to either get the amount of money 
corresponding to the center number or to play a lottery in which the outer numbers were the 
lottery’s stakes of a fifty-fifty chance. Subjects were explicitly told that the lottery game was 
hypothetical only; to that effect subjects expected no real payoff. Again they indicated their 
choices by pressing a button with the left or right index finger. 
 
2.4. EEG-Recording and Analysis 
The electroencephalogram was recorded from 28 tin electrodes, referenced against an 
electrode place on the left mastoid process, mounted in an elastic cap and placed according to 
the international 10-20 system. EEG was re-referenced offline to the mean activity at the left 
and right mastoid processes. All channels were amplified (bandpass 0.05 – 30 Hz) and 
digitized with 4 ms resolution. To control for eye movement artifacts, horizontal and vertical 
electrooculograms (EOG) were recorded using bipolar montages. To eliminate eye movement 
contamination from EEG signals we used the method described by Joyce et al (2004; for a 
comparison to other methods see Kierkels et al., 2006). Additionally, we controlled for other 
artifacts, e.g. muscle or heart rate, by visual inspection and removed afflicted epochs if 
necessary. 
 The computation of bins for ERP analysis was based on the difference between the 
number presented in the middle of the string and the arithmetic middle of the outer numbers, 
which can be calculated by the arithmetic middle of the two outer numbers. To give an 
example: assume the mid-number is 300, the number on the left side is always 0, and the right 
side number 800, then the arithmetic middle of the two outer numbers is 400. Accordingly, 
the resulting difference is 300 – (0+800)/2 = -100. Thus, negative differences are smaller and 
differences with a positive algebraic sign are larger than the expected value. We sorted trials 
into 5 bins including the differences 390 to 100, 90 to 50, 40 to -40, -50 to -90 and -100 to -
400. For each of these bins, we computed response-locked averages with an epoch-length of 
900 ms (baseline -300-0) separately for “yes” and “no” responses. For each subject, averages 
were filtered using a 1 to 8 Hz band pass filter before calculating the mean amplitude 30 – 70 
ms after response for statistical analysis. This time-window has been shown to capture the 
ERN-component which typically has a maximum around 50 ms. To test for effects, we 
calculated an ANOVA with the factors condition (lottery/center judgement), response (yes/no, 
whereas ‘yes’ in the lottery condition is related to choosing money and ‘no’ choosing the 
lottery) and bin (5 bins) for the electrode site Cz. Significance values will be reported 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, but the degrees of freedom uncorrected. In order to identify 
conditions causing significant interactions or main effects the corresponding post-hoc t-tests 
were performed. To adjust the significance level of one-tailed post-hoc t-tests for multiple 
comparisons  was set to 0.05 and an improved Bonferroni procedure based on the ordered p-
values was applied (Simes, 1986). According to Simes (1986), let p(1)  p(2)  ...  p(j) be the 
ordered p-values for testing H0={H1,H2,..,Hi}. H0 will be rejected, whenever pi < i*/j for i=1 
… j (see also Samuel-Cahn, 1996; Sen, 1999; for a critical discussion and Wendt et al., 2007 
for its application on EEG data ). We grouped our post hoc testing in the comparison of 
decisions at indifference point of the bisection task and decisions made at the endpoints (bins 
[-400;-100] and [100;390]). Correspondingly, we calculated critical p-values for 5 and 6 post-
hoc comparisons. The resulting critical values are shown in table 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
2.5. Behavioral Analysis 
Response frequencies were calculated for every subject by computing the percentage of ‘yes’ 
and ‘no’ responses given to each difference value. The same bins as used for the EEG 
analysis were assessed. For statistical analysis the mean percentage values of ‘yes’ response 
were used only, since percentage values of both response categories are inversely related. For 
global effect testing, we performed a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors condition 
(lottery/center judgement) and bin (5 bins, see previous section for details). Significance 
values will be reported Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, but the degrees of freedom 
uncorrected. For correction of post-hoc test’s alpha value see section 2.4. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Behavior 
Choices made for each difference value (in mean percentage) are depicted for the lottery and 
bisection tasks in figure 2A and B, respectively. In the lottery game, participants show risk 
averse behavior, indicated by the preferred choice getting a fixed hypothetical amount of 
money for difference values deviating slightly from the expected value in negative direction. 
The median of the certainty equivalents is given by the intersection of the colored lines. The 
 
Figure 3: Behavioral data. Mean percentage of choices are shown for the binary lottery (A) 
and the bisection task (B). The center is indicated by a dotted line and refers to the 
indifference point in the bisection task. (C) depicts the cumulated choices per bin for both 
task. Circles referring to “YES”-, squares to “NO”-responses. Indifference point was 
indicated by a dotted line. Please note, that statistical comparisons were only calculated for 
YES responses.  
 
 choices in the bisection task are peaked at zero for the ‘yes’ responses. Collapsing choices 
into 5 bins as done for the EEG analysis clearly illustrates the differences between the tasks 
(see figure 2C).  Statistical analysis reveals a significant interaction condition by bin 
(F(4,48)=33.38, p<0.001) as well as significant main effects (condition F(1,12)=14.39, 
p=0.003; bin F(4,48)=32.04, p<0.001). Comparing bins between conditions post-hoc contrasts 
are significant for the bins [100; 390] and [50; 90], but not for the remaining bins [-40; 40], 
[50; -90] and [-100; -400]. For example, these tests show that the difference in the means of 
the CE and the mean point are not significant. 
 
Order Contrast t-value pemp pcrit
1 [100; 390] 9.47 0.01 <0.001
2 [50; 90] 4.53 0.0125 <0.001
3  [-90; -50] -0.833 0.025 0.21 
4 [-40; 40] -0.345 0.0375 0.36 
5 [-100; -400] -0.167 0.05 0.43 
Table 1: Ordered p-values of the comparison of the relative frequency of “YES”-responses 
between conditions. Significant tests are indicated by pcrit values written in bold.  
3.2. Event-related potentials
The response-locked grand average ERPs are illustrated in figure 3. A clear negativity with a 
peak latency of approximately 50 ms and a mediofrontal distribution akin the ERN  
 
  
Figure 4, left side: response locked event related potentials for the lottery’s task endpoints 
(upper panel) and the indifference point for all conditions (lower panel) are shown.  
Right side: Topographies for the lottery conditions (A) choice lottery [bin 100;390] and (B) 
choice money [-100;-400] are shown. Lower panel depicts the mean amplitudes of the 
response locked ERPs at CZ per category. Circles referring to “YES”-, squares to “NO”-
responses. 
 
component emerged in the lottery task for those responses which entailed a divergence from 
the optimal behavior (i.e. choosing the lottery in bin 100;390 and choosing money for bin -
100;-400). By contrast, as illustrated by figure 4 (right panel), response-locked ERPs in the 
bisection task were not associated with a negativity. Statistical analysis of response locked 
ERPs resulted in the significant interactions condition x response x bin (F(4,48)=7.18, 
p=0.002), condition x response (F(1,12)=5.29, p=0.03), condition x bin (F(4,48)=3.23, 
p=0.03) and response x bin (F(4,48)=3.91, p=0.03). With regard to main effects, only the 
‘condition’ factor became significant  
(F(1,12)=5.78, p=0.03; for the remaining main effects response and bin F<0.9, p>.4). Post-
hoc comparisons comparing decisions between bins within and between conditions are 
illustrated in table 4.  
 
order Contrast t-value pemp pcrit
1 [-40;40] choice lottery vs. center no -1.437 0.008 0.085 
2 [-40;40] choice lottery vs. center yes -1.09 0.01 0.15 
3 [-40;40] choice lottery vs. choice money -1.01 0.0125 0.16 
4 [-40;40] choice money vs. center no -0.481 0.025 0.34 
5 [-40;40] center no vs. center yes 0.377 0.0375 0.36 
6 [-40;40] choice money vs. center yes 0.015 0.05 0.49 
 
1 [100;390] choice lottery vs. [100;390] choice money -4.55 0.01 <0.001
2 [100;390] choice lottery vs. [-400;-100] choice money -3.58 0.0125 0.002
3 [100;390] choice lottery vs. [100;390] center yes -3.05 0.025 0.005
4 [-400;-100] choice money vs. [-400;-100] choice lottery -2.6 0.0375 0.011
5 [-400;-100] choice money vs. [-400;-100] center yes -1.7 0.05 0.05
Tabelle 2:  Ordered p-values for the comparison of the mean ERN amplitudes between 
conditions. Significant tests are indicated by pcrit values written in bold. The ordering of the 
critical p-values was performed for the indifference point and both endpoints respectively. 
 
4. Discussion 
In the present study, action monitoring processes as indexed by the ERN component 
were differentially engaged in two decision making paradigms that have been frequently used 
in economic sciences to determine the utility of money. This suggests fundamental 
differences between the lottery and bisection methods at the cognitive and neural level. More 
specifically, whereas no ERN was found in the bisection task throughout the whole range of 
decisions, it characterized decisions of the less advantageous options at either endpoint of the 
range of possible decisions. That is, an ERN was found for “lottery”-decisions in trials that 
would have yielded a sure win greater than the mean outcome of the lottery. Similarly, an 
ERN was present for “money”-decisions in trials in which the mean outcome of the lottery 
would have exceeded the sure win. In general, the occurrence of an ERN in this task can be 
interpreted as an evidence for the subjects’ motivational participation even though the 
lottery’s payoffs were only hypothetical. It is known from previous research that the 
appearance of an ERN depends on the subjective significance in a given task (Hajcak et al., 
2005; Holroyd and Coles, 2008). The differences between the bins releasing the two most 
prominent ERNs indicates different degrees in action monitoring and is likely caused by the 
interaction of two factors: the difference between expected value and sure payoff on the one 
hand and the risk to loose on the other. In both ERN releasing decisions the difference 
between expected value and sure payoff was similar and in both situations the ERN occurred 
when subjects selected the (potentially) smaller payoff or expected value respectively. 
Nevertheless, the ERN’s amplitude was larger when subjects have chosen disadvantageously 
the lottery compared to the erroneous selection of a sure payoff. Obviously, the anticipation of 
a risky decision’s potentially negative outcome, namely to win nothing instead of getting a 
small but sure payoff in the unfavorable payoff selection, leads to increased activation of 
monitoring mechanisms despite similar expected values. 
How can these neurophysiological findings inform economic reasoning? By looking at 
the economic starting point of our analysis shown in Figure 1 we discuss the differences and 
similarities between these two methods.  In the bisection method the mean point in utility 
between the two monetary amounts is determined only by the utility function of money by the 
following formula:  
u(M)=0.5*u(x1)+0.5*u(x2). 
In the binary lottery method the certainty equivalent is determined by the utility function of 
money and other factors connected with the risk of the lottery, like probability weighting in 
prospect theory or regret or disappointment. According to prospect theory the certainty 
equivalent is:  
u(CE)=w(0.5)*u(x1)+(1-w(0.5))*u(x2) 
If we compare both formulas the difference is obvious: the weighting of probabilities w(prob). 
For other theories other differences can be expressed. If we use the formula of Prospect theory 
we would expect that the certainty equivalent CE and the mean point in the bisection task M 
are equal if we assume w(0.5)=0.5. In this case only the utility function of money determines 
the certainty equivalent. As we will see in our discussion with respect to this point the 
methods are similar. We find similarities for decisions around the indifference point. 
Differences occur for decisions far away from the indifference point. We start our discussion 
with these differences which are detectable by combining both methods and analyzing the 
influence of risk. 
 
We observed an ERN in the binary lottery condition, but not in the bisection method, for 
decisions far away from the indifference point, i.e. for decisions for which they had clear 
preferences. This appearance of an ERN indicates that hypothetical wins are engaging 
subjects. This finding is observed after the decision has been made. This implies that 
decisions are subjectively more important in the lottery condition and might be caused by the 
fact that the lottery task is phrased as if actual payoffs might be possible, but not in the 
bisection method. According to other findings (see below) in the bisection task the 
evaluations are the same, but in the lottery condition decisions might lead to different 
importance compared to the bisection method. This finding supports our arguments given in 
the discussion above that the observed differences between the methods used for determining 
the utility of money can be ascribed to the risk perception in the lottery task. 
 
It is important to note that an ERN is observed even though money was not paid. This means 
the effect is not caused by paying money, but by the task (without payoffs). This is interesting 
since it shows that even under hypothetical conditions reactions to the presentation of risk 
occurs. Subjects behave at least partly as if the choice was for real. By paying money for 
these lotteries one would expect increased ERN amplitudes only since the risk to loose would 
be experienced to be more real. Assuming that the remaining findings would be stable our 
argumentation that hypothetical payoff reflects the lower end of a parametric variation of risk 
would get additional support.  
According to standard economic theory of risky decision making only consequences 
and probabilities of the decision problem determine the choice of an individual. The influence 
of time between the presentation of the problem, the decision and the realisation of the 
outcome is very often neglected. By using ERPs we were able to identify the point in time 
where one part of post-decision evaluation processes takes place, namely, if the performed 
choice fits the subject’s response strategies and finally their long-term goals (for economic 
theories considering the impact of timing on decision processes see e.g. Albers et al., 2000). 
Neuroscientific methods such as ERPs and fMRI thus allow also to test theories of risky 
decision that suggest that lotteries engage emotional processes. 
 
Regarding similarities both methods used in the present investigation are resulting in 
similar utility functions of money. This conclusion is based on behavioral as well as on EEG 
data. Figure 3C shows no significant difference between the medians of the certainty 
equivalent and the mean point in the bisection method. The lower panel of Figure 4 does also 
not show a significant difference in the EEG data when making a decision at the indifference 
point which corresponds to the median in the behavioral data. Postulating the bisection 
method captured utility of money itself and, as argued previously, the binary lottery the 
combination of utility and risk, an implication of our finding is that utility function and 
probability weighting can be separated by initially determining the utility function with the 
bisection method and afterwards using the obtained function as input in the lottery method to 
get the lottery’s probability weighting experimentally. This procedure should be applied to 
lotteries with probabilities different from 0.5. In this case a simultaneous determination of the 
utility function and the probability weighting by only using the certainty equivalent method 
does not always lead to a clear separation between effects of the utility function of money and 
the probability weighting. The same procedure also allows to separate other effects related to 
risk and not to money evaluation. For example, the implications of Regret theory, 
Disappointment theory can be more easily tested by a combination of these two methods since 
the result of the determination of the utility function can be used in the analysis of the lottery 
method. In general using both methods and looking at the differences helps to characterize 
situations connected with risk (money and probabilities) in comparison to situations 
connected with certainty (only money).  
 
In our experiment the two tasks as implemented lead to the same results. In this simple 
version the problems observed by Galanter (1962) for the bisection method are not present 
showing that changing the task as in Galanter leads to disturbances, but the fundamental tasks 
(bisection method, lottery method) lead to the same neural reactions and the same behavioral 
data around the indifference point. Therefore, the bisection method can be used as a standard 
to determine utility functions. 
 
In summary we show that it is possible to combine two methods which are used to determine 
utility functions of money. We characterize common properties and differences of these two 
methods. The evaluation of money is the same in both conditions. By using this result it is 
possible to separate aspects of risky decision making. Our second finding shows one 
difference: Disadvantageous choices made in the risky decision making task are perceived as 
being relevant showing that even though payoffs were hypothetical they were treated by the 
participants as if they were  “real”. 
Our study allows for several extensions. One extension is to test the impact of real monetary 
payoffs by performing a treatment in which lotteries are paid. Another extension is to 
combine the bisection method and the binary lottery method to obtain a probability weighting 
function experimentally. 
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